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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND WARRANTIES OF
GOODS SOLD
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.*
W HEN a sale or a contract to sell is created by or integrated in
an operative writing, to what extent may extrinsic evidence
be offered either to prove warranties of the goods sold which are
not raised by the writing itself or to negative those warranties
which may thus be created? This is essentially the problem of
the relation between the parol evidence rule and warranties of
goods sold.'
The problem lies in one of the particularly difficult parts of
the parol evidence rule field. For while it is more clear that
the parol evidence rule forbids an express written term of a trans-
action or one implied from the writing to be altered or stricken
out by extrinsic evidence, it is not so obvious that the rule as
well forbids adding a term to a written contract which is already
so complete as to be capable of being enforced without it.- On
the basis of this latter general proposition one would expect it
to be the rule that is not permitted to show parol warranties in
the face of a written sale.3 Two matters, however, raise a ques-
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore,
Maryland.
'In general on this topic, see: Mechem, Implied and Oral Warranties
and the Parol Evidence Rule, (1928) 12 MixNNESoTA LAw REvimw 209-24:
Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods, (1930) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400-17; Williston, Liability for Honest Mis-
representation, (1912) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 414, 417 et seq.
-Stephen, Digest of Evidence, article 90, concludes his statement of the
rule as follows: ". .. Nor may the contents of such document be contradicted.
altered, added to or varied by oral evidence." The present writer prefers
the following as a statement of the rule, in which the concept of the in-
capability of adding to a written transaction by parol is implicit: "No
evidence can be considered for the purpose of varying the legal effect of the
written part of a transaction in issue which has achieved and continued
valid existence." Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule, (1929)
14 MinxNESOTA LAw REvIEW 20, 46. To add to the written part of a transac-
tion would, in effect, be "varying the legal effect" of it.
'See 2 Williston, Contracts, secs., 639 and 643.
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tion as to how far this generalization should actually be carried.
The one is the fact that some warranties are express and some
implied. It would seem that the parol evidence rule should not
exclude "implied" obligations of this sort. Then, further in this
direction, Professor Williston has made a cogent suggestion that as
certain types of "express" warranties, i.e., affirmations of fact,
are today, under the Uniform Sales Act, other than contractual
in nature, they, too, should be allowed to be shown by parol.'
The Restatement of Contracts in one of its "illustrations" 5 reaches
the same conclusion. It is proposed at this time to investigate
the involved legal materials and as well the theoretical implications
of Professor Williston's suggestion and the Restatement illustra-
4Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 215: "Another principle which has not
yet been very clearly brought out by the cases should be plain wherever it is
recognized that an affirmation or representation may form the basis of
liability in warranty even though there is no intent to warrant, and the
representations cannot fairly be construed as an offer to contract. The basis
of the parol evidence rule is that it must be assumed that when parties con-
tracted in regard to a certain matter and reduced their agreement to writing,
the writing expressed their whole agreement in regard to that matter. Tls
reason is obviously inapplicable to a situation where an obligation is im-
posed by law irrespective of any intention to contract. Such is frequently
the case with warranties. Therefore, if a buyer is induced by positive state-
ments of fact to enter into a written contract for the sale of goods, there
seems no reason why these statements should not be admitted in evidence.
False and fraudulent statements inducing the formation of a written con-
tract may, of course, be proved, and if, apart from the parol evidence rule.
a false but honest statement, inducing the buyer to enter into the bargain,
renders the seller liable as a warrantor though lie does not intend to contract,
there seems every reason for admitting evidence of such statements in spite
of the fact that the bargain was reduced to writing." See also 2 Willisto.
Contracts, sec. 643, containing much the same terminology. Professor Void
puts it as follows:
"For accurate analysis of the problem, however, it must be remembered
that warranty obligations may be independently imposed by law quite as well
as they may be promissory in their nature. Thus it can readily be seen
that, where the warranty obligation is derived from express or tacit
representations serving as inducements to the bargain, or rests on even
broader considerations of policy, the admission of parol evidence in that
regard does not serve to vary in any way the written words to which the
parties have agreed. . . .Accordingly the parol evidence rule has no proper
application to evidence bearing on the presence of warranties independently
imposed by law, unless the writing in terms effectually includes a disclaimer
of such warranties." Void, Sales, sec. 151.
5Restatement, Contracts, pp. 339-40, Illustrations of Clause (I) B of
sec. 240: "7. A and B in an integrated contract respectively promise to sell
and to buy a specific automobile. A contemporaneous oral undertaking on
the part of A to warrant the quality of the machine beyond the warranties
that the law would otherwise impose is inoperative. Oral representations
by A of the quality of the machine which induce B to enter into the written
contract are, however, operative to create a warranty. The representations
are independent of the contract though an inducement to its formation, and
the obligation of a warranty is imposed by law not from a promise but from
an assertion of fact."
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tion6 -with a view to finding how far case law or theory supports
the proposition that assertive and implied warranties are not de-
barred by the parol evidence rule.
The problem of proving extrinsic conduct capable of creating
a warranty is one of showing terms "collateral" to the writing
which are based upon the same consideration as the written obli-
gations.7 In analyzing the separate type situations which raise this
problem in warranty law it is proposed to use a modified form of
the phraseology adopted by the Restatement of Contracts for
handling the general problem of the operative effect of additional
oral agreements based upon the same consideration as the written
part of the transaction. A warranty, which from one angle is a
duty upon the seller, is thus based upon the same consideration as
supports the seller's promise to sell or act of selling.
The Restatement of Contracts permits to be shown. despite an
operative writing, such an extrinsic "agreement"8 based upon the
same consideration as "might naturally be made as a separate
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written
contract." 9  This can be stated also in a converse manner to the
effect that the parol evidence rule forbids adding to a written
transaction such extrinsic operative facts as would naturally be
included in such a writing by parties situated as were the parties
6Although the suggestion that assertive warranties should be showable
by parol has been made by Professor Williston, Professor Void and in the
illustration in the Restatement of Contracts, in this paper, for purposes of
convenience, it will be treated as Professor Williston's.
-The present writer has had occasion when treating the parol evidence
rule generally to touch on the matter of "collateral" terms in a contract.
Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule, (1929) 14 MINfN'RsoTA
LAw REviEw 20, 39-41.
sAt first it might appear that this clause of the Restatement was not
intended to solve problems of the admissibility of assertive warranties be-
cause it deals with "agreements," whereas the operative fact in question
for the assertive warranty is a representation or affirmation not intended
to be contractural but made legally binding by operation of law irrespective
of intent. The answer is that the Restatement "illustration," supra n. 5.
which reaches the same conclusion as Professor Williston's contention about
assertive warranties, is to be found listed under this very provision of the
Restatement text.
9Restatement, Contracts, sec. 240-In VHAT CASES INTEGRATION DoZs
NOT AFECr PRIOR OR CONTEMPORANEOUS AGREEMFN rs. (1) ai oral agree-
ment is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous
integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration relating to
the same subject matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with the inte-
grated contract, and (a) is made for a separate consideration, or (b) is such
an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by partie%
situated as were the parties to the written contract.
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to the particular writing." This altered phraseology does no
more violence to the original form than to express the proposition
in terms of what is forbidden rather than by what is permitted.'
The problem thus will be to determine whether those types of
oral activity which the courts permit to be shown are those "na-
turally" not included in the respective writings, and vice versa;
and whether Professor Williston's suggestion calls for permitting
to be shown something likewise not "naturally" so included. The
discussion both of the cases and of Professor Williston's sugges-
tion will be in terms of the "naturalness" of writing the particular
oral activity into the specific writing in the case. Before beginning
this it is proposed to list the various types of facts creating war-
ranties or similar jural relations.
A warranty is, generically, something" which gives rise to
a right in the buyer of goods to money damages or to a privilege
either to refuse to carry out or to rescind the performance of his
agreement to buy, which right or privilege is contingent upon the
failure of the chattel sold to meet a certain specific standard as
to its quality or performance. From the seller's standpoint a
breached warranty creates a duty or a "no-right." These two
capacities in the buyer,. the right to sue and the privilege to
rescind, follow by legal effect from the operative facts creating
"'See McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
the Control of the Jury, (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 365, 375-376, dealing with this
provision of the Restatement generally. See also, Ibid, 383-384, footnote 43,
suggesting that the Restatement proviso should be amended to read as
follows: "such an agreement as [in the opinion of the trial judge] might
naturally be made as a separate agreement."
"With all deference to the Contracts Restatement the writer feels that
this converse way of stating the proposition better fits the exigencies of the
warranty problem, for it avoids question begging as to whether the operative
facts creating warranties are "agreements" or not. This is avoided by
thinking of the "naturalness" of writing in the "operative facts" creative of
the warranty in question. It would seem that the parol evidence rule does
preclude as not collateral all those operative facts creative of warranties
which are naturally written into such writings.
12The word "something" is used advisedly, in view of the varying types
of activity which may create the legal consequences which are here con-
sidered under the heading of "warranty." It is not proposed to attempt any
more specific description in the way of a single phrase. Some, the express
ones, result from promissory expressions or manifestations of intention.
Others, the implied ones, result from certain of the details of the transaction
created for other purposes and having, except in their peculiar legal results,
no definite significance peculiar to warranties alone. See Williston, Sales,
2nd ed., sec. 180, citing with approval the definition of warranty laid down
by Lord Abinger in Chanter v. Hopkins, (1838) 4 M. and W. 399, 8 L. J.
Ex. 14: "A warranty is an express or implied statement of something,
which the party undertakes shall be part of the contract; yet collateral to
the express object of it .. "
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breached warranties. Other special capacities may be expressly
provided for in addition, such as the seller's expressed promise
to refund the money, to repair the defective chattel, or to supply
a new one. These are not warranties in themselves but rather
special capacities occasionally found to be incidental to express
warranties.
There appear to be seven type situations in which a seller of
goods may acquire liability concerning the ownership, quality or
performance of goods then sold by him. Not all of these are
"warranties," and the peripheral ones will be considered only for
purposes of contrast. These seven are prophetic or promissory
express warranties, implied warranties of fitness, assertive ex-
press warranties,' 3 fraudulent representations or deceit, tort lia-
bility for negligent construction, implied warranties of merchanta-
bility, and implied warranties of title.
A prophetic or promissory express warranty follows when the
seller has promised that the chattel sold will perform in the future
in a certain manner."" The implied warranty of fitness for pur-
pose also involves the future performance of the chattel, but it
follows without express promise when the buyer, relying on the
seller's judgment, informs him of the purpose for which the chat-
tel is to be used, and the seller, aware of this, selects the chattel."'
An assertive express warranty is based on an affirmation of
fact by the seller about an existing quality of the chattel. This
13The distinction between prophetic and assertive warranties is in-
dicated both by Professor Williston's suggestion and by the terminology of
the ,Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12: "Any affirmatim of fact or any pronmise
by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase
the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No
affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a
statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty."
14Professor Williston defines express and implied warranties as follows:
"An express warranty is derived from express language no matter whether
in form a promise or representation. An implied warranty arises where the
law attaches an obligation which is not expressed in any form." Williston.
Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 194. See also Mechem, Implied and Oral Warranties
and the Parol Evidence Rule, (1928) 12 MINNE OTr LAw REvIEw 209-24,
footnotes 7 and 8.
15Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15: "(1) Where the buyer, expressly, or by
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill
or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is
an implied warranty, that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose.
... (4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under
its patent or trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for
any particular purpose."
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affirmation, with certain stated exceptions,"0 regardless of whether
the seller knows it to be false, will impose liability therefor if it
tends to induce and does induce the sale to the buyer. An his-
torical and procedural distinction must be observed between the
assertive express warranty and the tort liability of the seller for
fraudulent representations or deceit. If with knowledge of its
falsity the seller makes a false material statement about the chat-
tel, he can be made liable therefor by this device." Then, too, a
manufacturer of chattels sold can be held for injuries caused by
negligence in their manufacture.'8 Thus we see the three legalistic
devices for handling the one problem of liability for the quality
of the goods at the time of the sale all of which require more than
the mere fact of sale to raise liability.
Certain liability concerning the goods follows more or less
automatically from the mere fact of sale without proof of extrinsic
statements by seller or buyer or of other extrinsic detail. Thus.
there are the implied warranty of merchantability.'0 imposing on
the seller the duty of furnishing goods up to a normal standard,
and the implied warranties of title.20
The problem now is, in terms of the Restatement terminology
as here adapted, to what extent is it "natural" to integrate the
various types of activity capable of creating the above mentioned
forms of liability into normally complete writings so that such unin-
tegrated oral activity will, by virtue of the parol evidence rule, be
no longer of valid effect. In considering in this vein the various
types of liability resembling or coming tinder the concept of war-
ranty it is proposed to adopt as a datum point the nature of a
,GI.e., statements of value and of mere opinion do not without more
constitute warranties. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12.
17See Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 195.
18MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1050, LRA 1916F 696, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440.
I9Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 15: ". . . (2) Where the goods are bought
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
20Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 13: "In a contract to sell, or a sale, unless a
contrary intention appears, there is-(l) An implied warranty on the part
of the seller that in case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and that
in case of a contract to sell he will have a right to sell the goods at the
time when the property is to pass. (2) An implied warranty that the buyer
shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods as against any lawful
claims existing at the time of the sale. (3) An implied warranty that the
goods shall be free at the time of the sale from any charge or encumbrance
in favor of any third person, not declared or known to the buyer before or
at the time when the contract or sale is made .. "
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simple pfomise or of an agreement or contract composed of such
promises. Essentially a promise is a statement by the promisor
making a prophecy of certain future activity on his part which
may, in certain events, be legally operative and create a duty to
perform or to pay money. Warranties are not of this sort save
in the- exceptional events of the additional capacities which may
be specifically provided to follow their breaches. The real.essence
of a warranty, viz., the existing quality or future performance
warranted, does not involve the future activity of the seller. To
be sure the seller's duty to pay money or no-right to enforce the
bargain upon breach may involve future activity, but they are
rarely "promised" and for that matter are but the normal incidents
which follow the breach of any promise.
In the order set out above the operative facts to create the
vanous sorts of warranty and similar liability get further and
further away from the nature of a simple promise, viz., a prophecy
of the future activity of the speaker. A prophetic or promissory
warranty is a statement of the obligor, prophesying to be sure, but
prophesying something other than his own conduct. The implied
warranty of fitness does not even require the statement of the
one to be bound. That of the other will suffice. An assertive
warranty is not even a prophecy of any future happening. It is a
narration of present fact. So it is with fraudulent representations.
Tort liability for negligent construction is not even dependent upon
statements, nor are the implied warranties of merchantability 1
and of title.
If Professor Williston's suggestion be supported by cases, it
would seem to be because the courts have concluded that prophetic
warranties, viz., prophecies of the future performance of the
chattel sold, are naturally included in operative writings; while
assertive and implied warranties, depending upon statements of
present fact, or upon other things than any statement of the
obligor are not naturally so included. This hypothesis, as here
stated, would seem to be based upon an assumption that it is
natural to include in writings all prophecies, whether of future
conduct of the promisor or of other happenings, but not to include
other types of operative facts capable of creating warranty lia-
21I.e., no other statement is involved than the "description" of the chattel
itself which is a requisite under Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15 (2). But such
a statement has other jural purposes than merely to create the implied
warranty of merchantability. See also -Uniform Sales Act, Section 16, in
connection with the analogous implied warranty when the sale is by sample.
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bility. Thus the question boils down to the theoretical and authori-
tative validity of his suggested distinction between the naturalness
of writing in all prophecies and of not writing in other operative
facts.
The materials will be discussed under three headings: first, a
comparative treatment of prophetic warranties and implied ones
of fitness, both of which involve the future performance of the
chattel; second, implied warranties of merchantability and of
title; and, third, a contrast of assertive warranties with the'tort
types of liability concerned with the present state of the chattels. 22
PROPHETIC WARRANTIES AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF FITNESS
FOR KNOWN PURPOSE
These warranties are similar, because they both involve lia-
bility for the future performance of the chattel sold.2 3  They dif-
22The great mass of the cases involving parol warranties makes it
necessary to eliminate certain topics from the present discussion. The
present treatment will be limited to the question of whether the integration
of the sales transaction, as such, by virtue of the parol evidence rule alone,
eliminates parol warranties which, otherwise, would be of operative effect.
Thus there will be eliminated the following problems: (1) The extent to
which a stated warranty (written or oral), by virtue of its being stated.
eliminates implied warranties; (2) The extent to which parol warranties are
allowed to be shown on a theory that the writing is "incomplete;" and
(3) cases in which parol warranties have been excluded not because of the
fact of a writing, but because of the presence of a stipulation thereinl ex-
pressly negativing extrinsic warranties. On the other hand, cases permitting
extrinsic warranties in the face of such stipulations will be used, on a theory
that such cases would as soon, or sooner, permit extrinsic warranties in the
face of a writing alone.
23A question may be raised as to the validity of putting into separate
groups (1) those warranties which concern the future performance of the
chattel and (2) those which concern its present quality. Is it valid to group
together the prophetic (promissory) express warranties and the implied
one of fitness for purpose as involving the future, and the assertive express
warranties, tort liability for deceit, and tort liability for negligent construc-
tion, as involving the present? Do not all five of these eventually turn
on how the chattel actually does perform after the time of the sale? The
answer is that the breach of all of them, as a practical matter, does depend
on future performance, but the demarcation contended for arises both from
the Sales Act, Section 12, and from the basis of Professor Williston's thesis
in contending for a distinction between assertive and prophetic warranties.
The ensuing footnote deals with that point more particularly. Analysis
discloses that the prophetic warranty and the implied warranty of fitness
both involve liability for the future performance of the chattel, as such, while
the assertive warranty (assertion of existing fact), tort liability for deceit
(false representation of existing fact), and tort liability for negligent con-
struction (which construction is complete before the delivery of the chattel)
all jurally are liability for the existing state of affairs. In the former two.
subsequent performance is an operative fact to fix liability. In the latter
three, subsequent performance is but evidential of the true operative facts,
i.e., the quality of the chattel at the time of the sale or contract to sell.
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fer in the operative facts which create them and also in that the
former type of warranty usually is as to a more specific detail
than the latter. For the prophetic express warranty the essential
operative fact is a "promise"2 or statement by the seller prophesy-
ing certain future happenings on the part of the thing sold which
will work liability for the failure of these things to happen if it is
of a sort which naturally tends to induce the sale and actually
does so. 25  As we shall see, this type of operative fact has been
thought by the courts to be "naturally" included in an integration
of a sales transaction, and hence not provable by parol. For the
implied warranty of fitness for purpose, which also involves the
future performance of the chattel, the essential operative fact is
a statement by the buyer notifying the seller as to the use to which
the buyer intends to put the chattel.2 6  Thus, if the seller be aware
of this notification and if the buyer has relied upon his skill and
judgment in the matter, there results liability upon the seller for
the failure of the chattel efficiently to perform the expected
function.
The problem now is the extent to which these operative facts
may be shown in the face of an integrated transaction omitting to
While, to be sure, the implied warranty of fitness for known purpose can
be said to involve a present quality of being fit, yet inasmuch as the future
element is expressed in its definition, which is not so for the three types of
liability dearly involving the present, this warranty seems more a matter
of the future than of the present. In view of the facts (A) that such a
distinction is the basis of the contention of Professor Williston, now under
discussion, (B) it has theoretical validity, and (C) is suggested only for
purposes of convenience in making contrasts concerning the naturalness of
integrating the various types of operative facts, it is proposed to use it for
this last purpose. As is disclosed later, the writer is not contending that
the difference between warranties of future performance and present quality
determines the matter of their provability by parol. Quite the opposite is the
case. The distinction is used only to point out that the cases have not
followed that line of difference in determining the major issue.
2
4A question suggests itself as to whether under Uniform Sales Act, sec.
12, "promises" and "affirmations of fact" are mutually exclusive as to subject
matter in the manner assumed by the present writer, viz., that "promises"
refer to prophecies of the future performance of the chattel, while "affirma-
tions of fact" are assertions about present facts concerning it. The writer
considers that "affirmation of fact" must refer to an existing fact and that
even if "promise" could include statements both of present fact and future
performance the former is jurally obsolete in view of the fact that liability
can be more easily worked out on the basis of the affirmation which, ipso
facto, it also is. Thus for practical purposes they are mutually exclusive and
synonymous with "prophetic warranty" and "assertive warranty" as used
here. The only warranties which have to be analyzed in terms of "promise"
under the Sales Act are those concerning the future performance of the
chattel.
25Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 12.
26Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 15, parts (1) and (4).
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mention them. Does the parol evidence rule forbid the showing
of statements by the seller prophesying the future performance of
the chattel and of statements by the buyer notifying the seller of
the expected future performance, along with facts to prove reliance
upon the seller's skill and judgment? The state of the cases is that
prophetic warranties cannot be shown by parol T in the face of a
27Lower v. Hickman, (1906) 80 Ark. 505, 97 S. W. 681 (capacity of
sawmill); Barry-Wehmiller Machinery Co. v. Thompson, (1907) 83 Ark.
283, 104 S. W. 137 (capacity of machine) ; Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg. Co.,(1917) 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Livermore,(1918) 179 Cal. 116, 175 Pac. 456 (that locomotive would do hauling);
Galpin v. Atwater, (1860) 29 Conn. 93 (that machines would work well and
not drop stitches) ; Robinson v. McNeill, (1869) 51 11. 225 (that book ac-
counts sold were collectible) ; Gifford-Wood Co. v. Western Fuel Co.,(1918) 209 Ill. App. 357 (that the cost of handling coal would be reduced
by use of machine sold) ; Conant v. National State Bank of Terre Haute,(1889) 121 Ind. 323, 22 N. E. 250 (that flour mill would make three kinds of
flour) ; Stoehrer and Pratt Dodgem Corp. v. Greenburg, (1925) 250 Mass.
550, 146 N.E. 34 (that machines would last several years without repairs) ;
McCray Refrigerator Co. v. Woods and Zent, (1894) 99 Mich. 269, 58 N. W.
320, 41 Am. St. Rep. 599 (that machine would preserve meats 30-50 days) ;
John Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, (1895) 107 Mich. 12, 64 N. W. 729(that machine would not require more power than old one) ; Hallwood
Cash Register Co. v. Millard, (1901) 127 Mich. 316, 86 N. W. 833 (that it
was impossible for clerk to cheat cash register) ; Detroit Shipbuilding Co.
v. Comstock, (1906) 144 Mich. 516, 108 N. W. 286 (that boiler would have
greater capacity than old one and be more economical) ; Wittemann Co. v.
Beck Malting and Brewing Co., (1914) 183 Mich. 227, 150 N. W. 109 (that
carbonating machine would make beer in two weeks instead of four or five
months) ; Porter Hardware Co. v. Peacock, (1922) 129 Miss. 129, 91 So.
856 (that engine would furnish sufficient power) ; Kummer v. Dubuque, etc.,
Roller Mills Co., (1903) 4 Neb. (Unoff.) 347, 93 N. W. 938 (as to quality
of flour to be produced by mill) ; Naumberg v. Young, (1882) 44 N. J. L.
331, 43 Am. Rep. 380 (that boiler would furnish sufficient steam for the
business) ; John van Benschoten, Inc. v. Rondos, (1925) 213 App. Div. 874,
209 N. Y. S. 427 (that seller would reimburse buyer for decline in price by
certain date) ; Hebard v. Cutler, (1917) 91 Vt. 218, 99 Atd. 879 (that auto
would develop 35 horsepower) ; Griffin v. Runnion, (1914) 74 W. Va. 641,
82 S. E. 686 (that horse would be eighty per cent. perfect in procreation) ;
Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, (1922) 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150 (that
machine would produce refrigeration and ice cubes) ; Seitz v. Brewers Re-
frigerating Machine Co., (1891) 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. 46, 35 L. E~d.
837 (that machine would cool a certain room) ; Bluegrass Canning Co. v.
Steward, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1909) 99 C. C. A. 159, 175 Fed. 537, (that ma-
chines would seal and make air-tight certain cans) ; American Mine Equip-
ment Co. v. Butler Consolidated Coal Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d)
217; Bareham and McFarland, Inc. v. Kane, (1930) 228 App. Div. 396,
240 N. Y. S. 123; Wright v. Couch, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d)
207; Goode-Cage Drug Co. v. Ives, (1931) 16 La. App. 383, 133 So. 813; C. J.
Howard, Inc. v. C. V. Nalley and Co., (1931) 44 Ga. App. 311, 161 S. E
380; Whitty Mfg. Co. v. Clark, (1932) 278 Mass. 370, 180 N. E. 315;
Nimmo v. Fitzgerald, (1927) 207 Cal. 565, 261 Pac. 1015; Buckeye Mfg.
Co. v. Wooley Foundry and Machine Works, (1900) 26 Ind. App. 7, 58
N. E. 1069; Cohan et al. v. Markel, (1926) App. Div., 213 N. Y. S. 681;
Acorn Silk Co. v. Herscovitz et al., (1925) 250 Mass. 553, 146 N. E. 35.
Contra: Florence Wagon Works v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., (1906) 145 Ala.
677, 40 So. 49 (that would last for three years) ; Sorenson v. Webb, (1923)
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND WARRANTIES
writing, while implied warranties of fitness for purpose may, by
the majority view, thus be shown."8
This would seem to show that the law fails to attach any par-
ticular significance to the nature of the quality warranted. i.e..
whether it is as to present fact or future performance, for these
cases show a failure to treat on the same basis the diverse opera-
tive facts reaching the same end of liability for future perform-
37 Idaho 13, 214 Pac. 749 (that cow was a good breeder) ; Yancey et al v.
Southern Wholesale Lumber Co., (1925) 133 S. C. 369, 131 S. E. 32 (in
which court was much "surprised" to find that the law of South Carolina
was that where the writing contained no warranty one could be shown by
parol); Louis De Jonge and Co. v. Printz, (1905) 49 Misc. Rep. 112, 96
N. Y. S. 750.
-s8inplied warranty showable by parol in face of a sinple writing:
Graham v. Eiszner, (1888) 28 Il. App. 269; Gifford Wood Co. v. Western
Fuel Co., (1918) 209 Ill. App. 357; Seeburg Piano Co. v. l.indner, (1921)
221 Ill. App. 94; Robinson Machine Works v. Chandler, (1877) 5t Ind.
575; Cooper v. Payne, (1905) 103 App. Div. 118, 93 N. Y. S. 69 (reversed
in 186 N. Y. 334, 78 N. E. 1076, 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1010); Sampson v.
Frank F. Pels Co., (1922) 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. S. 538; Morris Run
Coal Co. v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp and Paper Co.. (1924) 210 App. Div.
678, 206 N. Y. S. 676, affirmed in 152 N. E. 430: T. W. Little Co. v.
Fynboh, (1923) 120 Wash. 595, 211 Pac. 766; Guyandotte Coal Co. v.
Virginian Electric and Machine Works, (1923) 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S. 1.
512; Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, (1884) 110 U. S. 108, 3 Sup. Ct. 537.
28 L. Ed. 86; The St S. Angelo Toso, (1920) 265 Fed. 783; McDonald v.
Sanders, (1931) 103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122; Cohan et al v. ,Markel, (1926)
215 App. Div. 435, 213 N. Y. S. 681; Barrett Co. et al. v. Panther Rubber
Mfg. Co., (1928) 24 Fed. (2d) 329. Implied warranty showable even where
wrting contains warranty: Western Cabinet and Fixture M fg. Co. v. Davis.
(1915) 121 Ark. 370, 181 S. NV. 273; National Computing Scale Co. v.
Eaves, (1902) 116 Ga. 511, 42 S. E. 783; Elgin Jewelry Co. v. Estes anI
Dozier, (1905) 122 Ga. 807, 50 S. E. 939; Four Traction Auto Co. v. llurn,
(1912) 156 Iowa 725, 137 N. W. 1014; Owens Co. v. Leland Farmers'
Elevator Co., (1921) 192 Iowa 771, 185 N. IV. 590; Boulware v. Victor .\ut
Mfg. Co., (1910) 152 Mo. App. 567, 134 S. NV. 7 (opinion adopted in 163
Mo. App. 524, 143 S. W. 1197); Colt Co. v. Preslar, (1925) Mo. App.
274 S. W. 1100; Miller v. Winters, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. E.T. 1913) 144 N. Y. S
351. Implied warranty showable even -where writig contains stipulation
Missouri Paint and Varnish Co. v. Merck, (1926) 170 Ark. 1037, 282 S. W.
370; Coode-Cage Drug Co. v. Ives, (1931) 16 La. App. 383, 133 So. 813; C.
J. Howard, Inc. v. Nalley, (1931) 44 Ga. App. 311. 161 S. E. 380. Implied
warran-ty showable even where Turiting contains both arranty and stipula.
tion: Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, (1905) 127 Iowa 137, 102 N. W. 840.
S. F. Bowser and Co., Inc. v. McCormack, (1930) 230 App. Div. 303, 243
N. Y. S. 442. Contra: Telluride Power Co. v. Crane Co., (1902) 103 Ill.
App. 647, reversed in effect by ruling on appeal, (1904) -208 Ill. 218. 70 N. E.
319 (that no warranty existed on facts) ; Whitnmore et al. v. South Boston
Iron Co., (1861) 2 Allen (Mass.) 52; McCray Refrigerating and ColI
Storage Co. v. Woods and Zent, (1894) 99 Mich. 269, 58 N. W. 320; Rollins
Engine Co. v. Eastern Forge Co., (1904) 73 N. H. 92, 59 At. 382. 68 1L. R.
A. 441; Ventimiglia v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp.. (1932) 143 Misc.
Rep. 681, 257 N. Y. S. 27. In the cases apparently rejecting parol proof of
the implied warranty of fitness, it is sometimes hard to discern whether the
warranty is denied because of the parol evidence rule or because of the
absence of essential operative facts to create such warranties.
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ance. This would indicate that the validity of Professor Wil-
liston's suggestion about the assertive warranty will have to be
determined, as will be contended later, in terms other than those
of the difference in the quality allegedly warranted and this despite
the fact that his suggestion-that for a distinction between pro-
phetic and assertive express warranties-appears to be based on
such a difference, i.e., one between assertive warranties of present
fact and prophetic ones of future performance.
Merely by looking only at the two types of operative facts
now being discussed, those capable of creating prophetic war-
ranties and implied warranties of fitness for known purpose, one
could deduce from the line of cases forbidding the former but
allowing the latter by parol that it is "natural" to integrate into
writings such operative facts for warranties as are statements
jurally unfavorable to the speaker, but that it is not "natural" to
integrate other statements or still other operative facts not in the
nature of statements. This is one difference between the operative
facts creating a prophetic express warranty and those creating an
implied warranty of fitness for purpose.
And, for that matter, a promise, in addition to being a prophecy
of the future conduct of the promisor, is also a statement jurally
unfavorable to the speaker. The validity of Professor Williston's
suggestion depends on the law's taking the attitude of declaring
it not "natural" to integrate anything other than a prophecy. The
cases so far mentioned do, so it happens, draw a distinction be-
tween prophecies and other conduct, but they as well distinguish
between jurally unfavorable statements and other operative facts.
The validity of his suggestion thus is not finally decided by these
cases but must remain to be investigated further when the assertive
warranty cases are examined to see if they draw the line between
prophecies and other things, or between jurally unfavorable state-
ments and other things.
For that matter, why should not even prophetic express war-
ranties be provable by parol? They are not strictly promises in
the sense of prophecies of the future activity of the speaker. One
could, in denial of Professor Williston's thesis, argue that there
is a similarity between prophetic warranties and assertive ones
with the result that the latter must stand or fall, as regards
provability by parol, on the same basis as the former. They are
similar in this way: each involves the legal consequence of a duty
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to perform something in the future which follows by operation
of law from a statement which does not in itself predict the
future conduct of the obligor at all. Are not both quasi-contractual
in that the obligation engendered is not stated in the operative
fact, i.e., the statement, respectively of future performance or
present fact? Does a prophecy of future performance show any
more contractual intent than a statement of present fact? Cer-
tainly not under the Sales Act which works out liability in either
case on the basis of the same additional factors, viz., "tendency
to induce the sale" and actual inducement thereof. The future
conduct of the obligor, which is the normal content of "promises,"
is equally unexpressed in both types of warranty. Is not the obli-
gation "independently imposed by law"' - in each case?
But prophetic warranties seem to have acquired the status of
"promises" both from the phrasing of the Sales Act, with its
distinction betveen promises and affirmations of fact under the
heading of express warranties, and from Professor Williston's
assumption in arguing for his suggestion. In view of the fact that
the cases have so uniformly rejected parol proof of them, we
must assume that it is natural to write in those prophetic statements
of future performance which work this type of liability. We
must gather from these cases, standing alone, that at least all
prophetic jurally unfavorable statements are integrated. It seems
to the writer that quibbling as to the nature of a promise is better
avoided by stating that it is "natural" to integrate prophetic state-
ments-whether prophetic of the speaker's conduct or of the chat-
tel's performance-so that they cannot be proved by parol. The
question still remains whether it is as natural to integrate certain
non-prophetic statements. Professor Williston's suggestion is
based on a belief that only prophetic statements are naturally in-
tegrated and that hence assertive warranties, i.e., non-prophetic
operative facts to create them, may be shown by parol. When
that proposition is treated directly, the suggested similarity between
prophetic and assertive warranties will have bearing.
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
OF TITLE30
These warranties follow more or less automatically from the
bare fact of the sale and for operative facts involve a minimum
29Vold, Sales, sec. 151.
3 These warranties have been put into a group by themselves for the
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of subjective conduct of the parties. This conduct is the least
likely to be "naturally" written into the memorandum of the trans-
action. Thus there is an implied warranty that the goods sold
shall be of a merchantable quality, which follows, in a sale by
description, when the seller is a manufacturer or grower, under
the older law,3 and regardless of that under the newer law,"
and whenever, in either event, the buyer has not examined the
goods in such a manner as to have been able himself to discover
the specific defect. This implied warranty of merchantability is.
perhaps, the equivalent of that of "soundness from full price"
mentioned occasionally3 3 and that "against latent defects arising
in the course of manufacture," found elsewhere. 3' The cases
permit such a warranty to be shown in the face of a writing not
mentioning it.3 5
The same result follows for the implied warranties of title. "n
For these the only operative fact aside from those creating the
sale or contract itself is, under the older law, the fact that the
reason that they are so little capable of being controverted under the parol
evidence rule. The operative facts creating them are so unlikely to be
integrated into operative writings that there is no question but that they are
provable by parol. Separating them in this manner makes it unnecessary to
go into the question raised in footnote 23 of whether they involve future
performance or present fact. Thus the treatment of the controverted types
of liability which is dealt with in that fashion is enabled to be made a bit
more clear.
3Williston, Sales, 2nd Ed., secs. 232 and 233.
3"Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15: ". . . (2) Where the goods are bought by
description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether lie
be a grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality .. " See also Ibid, Section 16 (c),
with reference to the similar warranty in sales by sample.
33 As in Wells v. Spears, (1820) 1 McC. L. (S.C.) 421.
34 As in Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres and Co., (1896) 149 N. Y. 137; 43
N. E. 422; Bond and Maxwell v. Perrin, (1916) 145 Ga. 200, 88 S. E. 954.
3 5Miller v. Van Tassell, (1864) 24 Cal. 458; Bond and Maxwell v.
Perrin, (1916) 145 Ga. 200, 88 S. E. 954; First National Bank of Hagermni
v. Peterson, (1929) 472 Idaho 794, 279 Pac. 302; Whitmore et al. v. South
Boston Iron Co., (1861) 2 Allen (Mass.) 52; Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres
and Co., (1896) 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422; Dr. Shoop Family Medicine
Co. v. Davenport, (1913) 163 N. C. 294, 79 S. E. 602; Guyandotte Coal
Co. v. Virginian Electric and Machine Works, (1923) 94 W. Va. 300, 118
S. E. 512; Wisconsin Live Stock Ass'n v. Bowerman, (1929) 198 Wis. 447,
224 N. W. 729; Fox v. Boldt, (1920) 172 Wis. 333, 178 N. W. 467, modified
in 172 Wis. 333, 179 N. W. I; Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144;
Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, (1905) 127 Iowa 137, 102 N. W. 840:
Loxtercamp v. Lininger Improvement Co., (1910) 147 Iowa 29, 125 N. W.
830; Rowe v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., (1921) 61 Mont. 73.
201 Pac. 316: Swift and Co. v. Etheridge, (1925) 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E.
453; Eureka Elastic Paint Co. v. Bennett Hedgpeth Co., (1908) 85 S. C.
486, 67 S. E. 738; Hooven and Allison Co. v. Wirtz, (1906) 15 N. D. 477.
107 N. W. 1078; Colt Co. v. Farmer, (Mo. App. 1926) 286 S. W. 399.
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goods are in the seller's possession. This is no longer an essen-
tial fact.
Practically the only3 7 cases which reject any implied warranties
by parol are the minority group of cases involving implied war-
ranties of fitness for purpose which have been treated above. While
tfie majority cases on this point have determined that it is not
"natural" to integrate the buyer's statement of his purpose in buy-
ing, yet it can be seen that such a statement is nwre naturally
written than the operative facts for implied warranties of mier-
chantability and title. The buyer's statement as an operative fact
for the warranty of fitness does involve subjective conduct of the
parties more peculiar to the instant transaction. And it could be
expressed feasibly in the bill of sale or other memorandum, such
as "Sold one truck, for hauling coal."
The operative facts in these implied warranties do not involve
jurally unfavorable statements. While these cases do not, standing
alone, support a conclusion that it is "natural" to integrate jurally
unfavorable statements, yet they do carry forward the tentative
suggestion made in the preceding part of this treatment from a
contemplation of the cases on prophetic Nwarranties and implied
warranties of fitness for purpose. Here we find certain operative
facts which are not jurally unfavorable statements held by the
cases to be not "naturally" written. It will remain to be seen in
the ensuing section whether the cases squarely decide that the line
of "naturalness" is to be drawn between jurally unfavorable state-
ments and other things or between prophecies and other things.
THE ASSERTIVE WARRANTIES AND SIMILAR FORMS OF LIABILITY
FOR THE EXISTING CONDITION OF THE CHATTEL X\'I EN SOLD
Thus far we have dealt principally with the olerative facts
which create liability for the failure of the chattel to come up to
certain standards of future performance. We have seen that
the parol evidence rule applies to the clearly contractual prophetic
warranty and does not apply to the quasi-contractual implied war-
ranties of fitness for a known purpose, merchantability, and title.
Now we have to deal with the quasi-contractual assertive war-
ranty which is the principal subject of Professor Williston's con-
tention.
36 Miller v. Van Tassell, (1864) 24 Cal. 458; Bond and Maxwell v.
Perrin, (1916) 145 Ga. 200, 88 S. E. 954; Trigg v. Farris, (1844) 5 Humph.
(Tenn.) 343; James C. Word v. Win. Calvin, (1858) 1 Head (Tenn.) 506.3 7Supra note 28.
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One thing which militates against the theoretical soundness of
his suggestion is the difficulty of drawing any practical line of
distinction between the prophetic warranty and the assertive one
for purposes of applying the rule.38 For instance, how shall we
classify an oral warranty that an automobile is constructed so as
to go sixty miles an hour? Is it prophetic of performance o1
assertive of fact?"° This inquiry relates to the old problem of
whether there could be a warranty of future events, here called
a prophetic warranty. Blackstone, writing at a time when the
tort-deceit element in warranties was predominant, thought that
there could not be.4" This was probably because of the impossi-
bility of "knowingly" making a false statement about the future.
Professor Williston, in commenting on this, says that Blackstone's
statement still holds good unless there is (1) an "actual con-
tract" (whatever that is), or (2) a real representation as to an
existing fact.
41
This similarity of prophetic and assertive warranties, adverted
to above, would seem to indicate that they should be treated to-
gether so that all should be allowed by parol or none. Rather than
to say that prophetic warranties are "contractual" and hence na-
turally integrated and assertive warranties "quasi-contractual"
and hence not naturally written in, the writer would say that all
of them are "non-contractual" in one sense, i.e., they do not hn-
mediately involve prophecies of the future activity of the speaker."
But even aside from this objection to Professor Williston's thesis
it seems to the writer that there are theoretical objections which
can be shown even if we assume the practicality of making the
basic dichotomy indicated by his suggestion. These objections
38The "illustration" from the Restatement of Contracts, supra note 5,
which accords with Professor Williston's suggestion, makes a distinction
between "undertakings" and "representations" in stating hypothetical cases
of prophetic and assertive warranties, respectively. Is not this language
highly conceptual and unrealistic? Does it aid in deciding which warranties
are prophetic and which assertive?
39It is submitted that the Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 12, with its distinc-
tion between promises and affirmations of facts generally as operative facts,
does not make necessary a sharp classification of situations into the one or
the other. Rather the two are alternative devices for giving operative effect
to statements generally which fall into either or both of these classes. It is
possible to argue that a given statement is one or the other of these without
pointing out which. Professor Williston's suggestion, however, does require
a sharp demarcation and assignment of the operative fact in question to
one group alone.
403 Blackstone, Commentaries 165.
41Williston, Sales, 2nd Ed., sec. 212.
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will be treated on a basis of this assumed separateness of the as-
sertive warranty.
We are now dealing with three types of jural activity con-
cerning the present state of the chattel, viz., the assertive express
warranty, tort liability for deceit by fraudulent representations.
and tort liability for negligent construction. The last of these
presents no problem under the parol evidence rule and is mentioned
but for contrast. The operative facts to establish this type of lia-
bility do not lend themselves to integration into writings and so
raise no question of the "naturalness" of doing so. Rather the
parol evidence rule concerns the assertive express warranty, for
which the tangible operative fact is the making of a statement by
the seller, and the tort of deceit, for which the operative facts are
such a statement and a knowledge of its falsity.
In each of these there is present a statement by the seller of
some existing quality of the chattel. In the case of the warranty
the other requirements are that it be false, be of a type calculated
to induce the sale, and that it actually does induce the sale to the
buyer's damage. These other required operative facts do not in-
volve the subjective conduct of the parties. On the other hand.
in the case of the tort liability for deceit, in addition to the re-
quirement of a statement by the seller and the obvious ones of
falsity and damage, there is an operative fact which does involve
subjective conduct of at least one of the parties, the seller's knowl-
edge of the falsity of the statement. Thus, in so far as the sub-
jective conduct of the parties is concerned, the only difference
between the assertive express warranty and tort liability for deceit
is that the latter requires the knowledge of falsity on the part of
the tort-feasor where the former does not require it of the obligor.
It is only recently, primarily by the statutory creation of the asser-
tive express warranty, that an analogous element, the so-called
"intent to warrant," has clearly been banished from the express
warranty.
43
420n the other hand, both types could be called "contractual" in this
sense: both represent liability resulting from the express words of the
obligor.
43The Sales Act, sec. 12, has, in effect, substituted "tendency to induce
the sale" for the erstwhile "intent to warrant" as an additional operative
fact which must accompany the statement in order to work warranty liability.
Compare both of these with the additional operative facts required in the
case of the action for false representations or deceit, viz., materiality and
knowledge of falsity. Are not all of these devices for selecting some, but not
all, statements about chattels sold to be operative and work liability.
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Despite the close similarity in operative facts between these
two forms of liability the authorities have reached opposite con-
clusions on the question of allowing them to be shown by parol
in the face of an operative writing. It seems clear 44 that the
parol evidence rule does not forbid showing fraudulent repre-
sentations by parol in the face of an integration. On the other
hand, the majority of cases45 run counter to Professor Williston's
442 Williston, Contracts, secs. 634 and 643; Bareham and McFarland.
Inc. v. Kane, (1930) 228 App. Div. 396, 240 N. Y. S. 123; C. J. Howard.
Inc. v. C. V. Nalley and Co., (1931) 44 Ga. App. 311, 161 S. E. 380,
Blecher v. Schmidt, (1931) 211 Iowa 1063, 235 N. W. 34; J. B. Colt Co. v.
Brown, (1928) 224 Ky. 438, 6 S. W. (2d) 473; numerous dicta in the
cases denying the provability of assertive warranties indicate that the as-
sertions could have been proven had they been made fraudulently.45Bush v. Bradford, (1849) 15 Ala. 317 (age and soundness of horse)
Hauger v. Evins and Shinn, (1881) 38 Ark. 334 (condition of boat) ; Federal
Truck and Motors Co. v. Tompkins, (1921) 149 Ark. 664, 231 S. W. 553
(that truck was only eight months old) ; Bond and Maxwell v. Perrin,
(1916) 145 Ga. 200, 88 S. E. 954 (that second hand auto was in good
condition) ; Vierling v. Iroquois Furnace Co., (1897) 170 II. 189, 48 N. E.
1069 (that iron was "best Ohio Valley Iron") ; Rodgers v. Perrault, (1889)
41 Kan. 385, 21 Pac. 287 (soundness of horse) ; Ehrsam v. Brown, (1902)
64 Kan. 466, 67 Pac. 867 (good material, first class workmanship) ; Storer
v. Taber, (1891) 83 Me. 387, 22 Atl. 256 (soundness of jacket) ; Lamb v.
Crafts, (1847) 12 Mete. (Mass.) 353; Keller v. Webb, (1879) 126 Mass.
393; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Thompson, (1891) 46 Minn.
15, 48 N. W. 415; Vrooman v. Phelps, (1807) 2 John. (N.Y.) 177 (that
slave sold was honest and sober) ; Van Ostrand v. Reed, (1828) 1 Wend.
(N.Y.) 424, 19 Am. Dec. 529; Mayer v. Dean, (1887) 54 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
315, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E. 261, 5 L. R. A. 540 (that mustard was free
from dirt) ; Reed v. Wood, (1837) 9 Vt. 285; Bond and Green v. Clark.
(1863) 35 Vt. 577; Hebard v. Cutler, (1917) 91 Vt. 218, 99 Ati. 879;
Randall v. Rhodes, (C.C.R.I. 1851) 1 Curt. 90, Fed. Cas. No. 11556 (that
ship was built of white oak timber) ; Marmet Coal Co. v. Peoples Coal Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 141 C. C. A. 402, 226 Fed. 646 (that barges were in
good and navigable condition) ; Hamilton Iron & Steel Co. v. Groveland
Mining Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1916) 147 C. C. A. 324, 233 Fed. 388 (as to
the manganese content of ore) ; Kain v. Old, (1824) 2 B. & C. 627 (that
ship was copper bolted) ; Harnor v. Groves, (1855) 15 C. B. 667; Blecher
v. Schmidt, (1931) 211 Iowa 1063, 235 N. W. 34: First National Bank of
Hagerman v. Peterson, (1929) 47 Idaho 794, 279 Pac. 302; McNaughton v.
Wahl, (1906) 99 Minn. 92, 108 N. W. 467; Schweir v. Thorns, (1862) 3
F. & F. 243; Daniel Smith v. Obed Williams, (1810) 1 Murph. (N.C.) 426:
Etheridge v. Palin, (1875) 72 N. C. 213; Jeremiah Eighmie v. Edgar B.
Taylor, (1885) 98 N. Y. 288.
Contra: Florence Wagon Works v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., (1906) 145
Ala. 677, 40 So. 49; Sorenson v. Webb, (1923) 37 Idaho 13, 214 Pac. 749
(that cow was with calf) ; Waterbury v. Russell, (1874) 8 Baxt. (Tenn.)
159 (that corn was equivalent of corn in crib) ; Wright v. General Carbonic
Co., (1921) 271 Pa. St. 332, 114 Atl. 517; Fudge v. Kelley, (1915) 171 Iowa
422, 152 N. W. 39; Neal v. Flint, (1895) 88 Me. 72, 33 Atd. 669; Phelps v.
Whittaker, (1877) 37 Mich. 72; Burns v. Limerick, (1913) 178 Mo. App.
145, 165 S. W. 1166; Landreth et al. v. Wyckoff, (1901) 67 App. Div. 145,
73 N. Y. S. 388; Eureka Elastic Paint Co. v. Bennett Hedgpeth Co.. (1908)
85 S. C. 486, 67 S. E. 738. In the following cases the courts apparently
permit the showing of assertive warranties by parol, but the cases do not
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suggestion and hold that the rule forbids the showing of assertive
express warranties by parol.
Why should there be this distinction between two types of lia-
bility which have a common denominator in the requirement of an
assertive statement by the seller for operative facts? One explana-
tion is the conceptual distinction between tort and contract, to tile
latter of which fields alone does the parol evidence rule apply.
Then, too, even in the realm of contract and under the parol evi-
dence rule, fraud, if it goes to vitiate the whole transaction, has
always been permitted to be shown by parol," as a way of show-
ing that no written transaction ever achieved and continued valid
existence. The assertive warranty does not destroy the entire
transaction but is merely an incident thereof. Then, aside from
these conceptual considerations, the distinction made by the cases
between the provability of fraudulent representations and the
non-provability of the assertive warranties can probably furtlt'r
be rationalized along several lines. With the assertive warranty
the essential operative fact-the statement-can be readily writ-
ten, and so it is thought naturally written. For the tort there is.
in addition to the statement, another essential operative fact, the
knowledge of falsity by the seller, which cannot by nature be con-
fined to written form. Thus in such a case it is not even required
that the thing which could have been written should so be. Fur-
ther, one could argue that the relaxation of the parol evidence rule
is a punitive device for administering societal treatment to fraud-
feasors. Similarly one could say that the existence of the guilt'
mind on the part of the seller makes it more likely that the buyer's
testimony as to the oral representations is itself true. It has been
pointed out that one basis for the parol evidence rule generally
is the likelihood of inaccurate testimony from the interested buy-
er.4 7 Finally, under the parol evidence rule itself, when fraudulent
make it clear whether they proceed on a theory of fraudulent representations
or of assertive warranties, or what type of fact is thus asserted or repre-
sented: Stracener v. Nunnally Bros., (1929) 11 La. App. 541, 123 So. 911.
same case on original hearing, 121 So. 617; Yancey v. Southern Whole-
sale Lumber Co., (1925) 133 S. C. 369, 131 S. E. 32; Hogg and Belcher
v. Cardwell, (1856) 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 151; Bolt et al. v. State Savings
Bank, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 179 S. W. 1119.46Strahorn, The -Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule. (1929) 14 M.xe-
SO'TA LAW REviEw 20, 33: ".... the rule applies only to the extent to which
the transaction is free from destruction or alteration by reason of its imper-
fections."
47See McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device
for the Control of the Jury, (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 365. 366-367. Does not
Professor McCormick's excellent article force us to re-think the relation
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representations are set up, either in defense or as a basis for suit,
is the writing an operative fact to the particular liability asserted?
Is the writing part of "a transaction in issue in the instant case"
within the rule that it is forbidden only to vary such as this ?48
When we look at the two phenomena in substance, however,
it seems that there is an inconsistency between allowing parol
proof of knowingly false statements and not allowing parol proof
of innocently false ones which tend to and do induce the sale.
It is this substantial inconsistency which, viewed alone, furnishes
the strongest theoretical argument for Professor Williston's sug-
gestion.49  It is easy to argue that it was contemplated by the
Sales Act, in creating the separate category of the assertive war-
ranty, to create a form of tort liability without the requirement
of guilty knowledge which would have, had this been recognized,
carried with it the implication of tort liability under the parol
evidence rule, i.e., provability by parol. It is interesting to specu-
late what would have been the situation had the relevant portion
of the Sales Act been enacted by itself, away from the contractual
category of sales, possibly under a delictual one, designedly to
abolish the requirement of guilty knowledge in deceit. No doubt it
would be held that such statements could be proven by parol.
Discussion of the effect of the Sales Act as supporting Pro-
fessor Williston's suggestion is further complicated by the fact
that so few of the authorities on the question come from cases
decided in jurisdictions where the Sales Act was then in force and
that in so few of these cases were the courts aware that the
existence of the Sales Act gave them occasion to consider the
between the parol evidence rule and the typical rules of evidence? See Ibid.,
373: wherein, in treating of the Thayer dogma that the rule is one of the
substantive law and not one of the law of evidence, he says: "Nevertheless,
though excluded from the family fold of rules of evidence, it can claim
common ancestry in distrust of the jury." Consider also the relation between
the parol evidence rule and the best evidence rule in the following vein: The
best evidence rule is based upon a preference for written or real evidence
over oral, secondary, or testimonial evidence as evidential facts, whereas the
parol evidence rule indicates a preference for writings as operative facts.
4sStrahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule, (1929) 14 MIhNNE-
SOTA LAW REvIEw 20, 45.
49The view contended for by Professor Williston was enunciated by the
Tennessee court long before the Sales Act was drafted: "If the statement
was made to influence the bargain and it did have that effect, it would be
equivalent to a warranty, whether innocent or fraudulent. The fact that it
was not inserted in the written contract can make no difference. It was not
a part of the contract of sale, but the inducement to it. It is a distinct
collateral matter on which liabilities arise that may be enforced." Hogg and
Belcher v. Cardwell, (1856) 4 Sneed. (Tenn.) 151, 156-7.
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desirability of Professor Williston's suggestion and the possibility
of the act's having enacted a new rule.aO Cases in which the cues-
tion could and ought to be decided no doubt will continue to be
swamped in the sea of decisions which have been rendered prior
to the adoption of the Sales Act.
Thus it seems that the courts have concluded-Professor \Vil-
liston contra-that it is natural to include assertions about the
chattel into operative writings creating sales or contracts to sell
and that hence they are precluded if not included." It remains
for us to discuss the significance of these contrary views and the
general question of the naturalness of including assertive war-
rarities in writings.
In doing this it is proposed to consider no longer the incon-
sistency between the deceit cases and the assertive warrant),
cases. Rather the immediate problem is to discern whether there
is such an equivalent similarity between assertive warranties and
implied warranties as to indicate a substantial inconsistency be-
tween the cases which permit the various implied warranties by
parol and the ones which forbid assertive ones.
How can we rationalize the cases which allow implied war-
ranties by parol and do not allow assertive ones? What light do
they throw on the question of what is "naturally" written into
the final integration of sales contracts? It seems to the writer
that the latter cases confirm the tentative conclusion advanced
5Oln the following cases the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 6th circuit
specifically rejected the contention that the Uniform Sales Act made asser-
tive warranties provable by parol: Marmet Coal Co. v. People's Coal Co.,(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 226 Fed. 646, reviewed in (1916) 16 Col. L. Rev.
253, and Hamilton Iron and Steel Co. v. Groveland Mining Co., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1916) 233 Fed. 388.
51A matter analogous to that of showing an assertive warranty by parol
is that of showing by parol that the goods were sold by sample when the
writing fails to mention the sample. See Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 249.
and Uniform Sales Act, sec. 16, concerning the implied warranties which
arise when the sale is allowed to be shown to be by sample. The cases treat
the use of the sample as the equivalent of an assertion about the present
state of the chattel and likewise refuse to allow this to be shown by parol.
Thus they likewise militate against the authoritative soundness of the Willi;-
ton thesis. Harrison v. McCormick, (1891) 89 Cal. 327, 26 Pac. 830, 23
Am. St. Rep. 469; Gardiner v. McDonough, (1905) 147 Cal. 313, 81 Pac.
964; Germain Fruit Co. v. Armsby Co., (1908) 153 Cal. 585, 96 Pac. 319(can use sample to identify subject matter but not as equivalent of war-
ranty) ; Thomson v. Gortner, (1891) 73 Md. 474, 21 AtI. 371; Pike v. ray,(1869) 101 Mass. 134; Standard Milling Co. v. De Pass, (1913) 154 App.
Div. 525, 139 N. Y. S. 611, affirmed in 214 N. Y. 638, 108 N. E. 1108;
Stroock and Co. v. Lichtenthal, (1928) 224 App. Div. 19, 22>9 N. Y. S. 371;
Wiener v. Whipple, (1881) 53 Wis. 298, 10 N. W. 433, 40 Am. Rep. 775;
Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144; Comment, (1905) 4 Mich. L Rev. 81.
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above in the light of the distinction between prophetic warranties
and implied warranties of fitness. This is that it is "natural" to
write into memoranda of transactions all operative statements
which are jurally unfavorable to the immediate speaker and that
it is not "natural" to write in any other of the types of operative
facts capable of creating the sort of liability now being discussed,
whether statements not jurally unfavorable or operative facts not
in the nature of statement. 2
The cases make the distinction between the various form,; of
warranty type liability; this terminology seems accurately to ra-
tionalize the distinction of the cases; and, on principle, it seems
to the writer to be a better way of stating what is "natural" to
integrate and what is not than is the conceptual disinction between
"contractual" and "quasi-contractual." The upshot of it is that.
while Professor Williston has concluded it to be natural to inte-
grate only statements about the future, i.e., prophecies, the cases
have concluded that it is natural to integrate all jurally unfavor-
able statements, which include prophecies and assertions. To this
the fraudulent representation proposition forms a substantially un-
justifiable exception.
But is it thus in fact and in human understanding natural to
write in all jurally unfavorable statements? We can discus,; it
by postulating that all will agree that it is natural to write in the
most contractual of promises, the speaker's prophecy of his owil
activity. That is the typical kind of objective operative fact which
is written. The cases and Professor Williston agree that likewise
the prophetic warranty, i.e., the prophecy of the future performance
of the chattel itself, is also naturally written in. Is not the asser-
tive warranty, a third type of jurally unfavorable statement, as
52 1t must be remembered that the phrase "jurally unfavorable state-
ment" has reference to the operative fact creative of warranty liability, and
not to the warranty itself. All warranties are jurally unfavorable to th."
seller. Some warranties, however, result from statements which are jurally
unfavorable to the speaker, and other warranties result from other operative
facts, either jurally favorable statements, or other things than statements.
The writer's contention is that the provability of warranties by parol doe.
not directly depend on the type of warranty, but on the type of operative fact
creating it. It seems that it is natural to integrate those operative facts
which are statements jurally unfavorable to the speaker, but not natural to
integrate other statements or other facts, with the result that the (jilestio
of the warranty's having survived the writing depends on how natural it is
to integrate the specific operative fact which creates the warranty. "War-
ranties" are concepts. "Operative facts" have a trifle more reality. The test
for the warranty's survival of the writing should be in terms of the natural-
ness of writing in the relatively more real operative fact.
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close analytically to the prophetic warranty as the latter in turn
is to the promise of the speaker's own activity which, without
doubt, is naturally written? What authority is there for saying
that a jurally unfavorable statement of the future performance
of the chattel is naturally written while a jurally unfavorable
statement of its present status is not? It seems to the writer that
the greatest quality which the assertive warranty has in common
with the two types of operative fact which are agreed to be natu-
rally written is that of its being jurally unfavorable to the speaker.
No traces of this quality can be found in the other types of opera-
tive fact which Professor Williston insists on grouping with it.
Analytically speaking, the former relation seems a closer bond of
kinship than is the dubious one of "quasi-contractual" which is
what must be relied on in order to give custody of the assertive
warranty to the implied warranty family. Then, too, the distinction
between jurally unfavorable statements and other operative facts
is a much neater one to make than is the one necessitated by Pro-
fessor Williston's suggestion of dividing proplhecies of the future
from statements of the present. The cases cleave to a more work-
able distinction.
Apparent support of Professor Williston's suggestion would
seem to come from the rule concerning proof of the description
of the chattel by parol. For example, if the memorandun ierely
provides for "a horse," it may be shown by parol "what horse. ' '
But there is no inconsistency between this and denying pernission
to prove the seller's assertion about the horse. "Vhat horse" i-
necessary to be known to have all enforceable contract. But the
assertive warranty would be unnecessary. "\Vhat horse," when
proved by parol, because necessary, does not increase the units of
obligation. The contract is still for a horse, as provided for in
writing. But proof of parol assertions does increase the units of
liability. What was a written contract to sell a horse would be-
come that plus a further contract to pay money if the horse did not
possess a certain quality. "What horse" is not jurally unfavor-
able. Unfavorable consequences have resulted from the integrated
53Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule. (1929) 14
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 20, 36. "The rule forbids facts offered to vary
the legal effect of certain writings. Facts which are permissible under
this category (Insufficiency of Expression) and which furnish some detail
essential to the enforceability of the written transaction carry forward the
legal effect of the writing rather than vary it and so are by hypothesis not
affected by the rule."
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statement about "a horse." Thus the rule about parol proof of
identity does not militate against the jurally unfavorable test to
which the cases on parol warranties adhere.
One wonders whether a good test for the "naturalness" of
writing operative facts in sales transactions could be found in
terms of the ease with which the various operative facts may be
translated into written words and thus set down. But were this
the true test, it would merely destroy further the validity of Pro-
fessor Williston's suggestion. For what is there that makes it any
easier to translate a prophetic statement about the future than
an assertive one about the present? The cases require that the
former must always be written.. To this Professor Williston
agrees. Then, for that matter, were this the test, the implied
warranty of fitness for purpose would also have to be written, be-
cause it would be quite simple to translate it into the words of the
bill of sale, as suggested above, viz., "sold one truck, for hauling
coal." One cannot conclude that such is the specific test for "na-
turalness" in the light of the cases. And, even if it were, it would
prove Professor Williston's suggestion to be faulty. Speculating
about such a hypothetical test merely lends further support to the
test of whether the operative facts are jurally unfavorable state-
ments or not.14
As further supporting the conclusion, in opposition to Profes-
sor Williston's thesis, that it is equally natural to integrate pro-
phetic and assertive warranties, there is the matter of the termi-
nology typically found in "stipulations" inserted by parties to sales
contracts, usually by printed forms, which serve to supplement the
parol evidence rule in excluding extrinsic evidence generally. Fre-
quently one finds stipulations in the following vein: "The seller
shall not be bound by any representation or promise made by any
agent relative to this transaction which is not embodied herein."
The present writer feels that the prevalence of this similarity of
treatment of representations and promises supports a conclusion
that human understanding has it that it is as natural to integrate
the former as it is the latter. The parties who draft these form
stipulations which are calculated merely to express what the parol
evidence rule implies seem to feel that there is no discernible dis-
54A minor consideration suggests itself. The typical writings which
integrate transactions generally contain two types of operative facts, records
of past facts and predictions of the future conduct of the parties, viz..
promises. Is it as natural to write in present statements of present facts,
i.e., assertive warranties?
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tinction between assertive warranties and prophetic ones. To be
sure, they usually are drafted by the interested seller. But were
human understanding in accordance with Professor Williston's
suggestion, the seller, in order to avoid liability, would be even
more explicit about the assertive warranty than about the prophetic
one, because the latter one is already sufficiently taken care of to
the seller's advantage by the rule itself.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO ELIMINATE WARRANTIES WHICH
RESULT FROM THE WRITING ITSELF"
Certain warranties are said to be expressed in a writing when-
ever the parties see fit to write out the statements which serve as
operative facts to create this type of liability. Certain others fol-
low automatically from the written operative facts which create
the main transaction itself. To what extent can any of these war-
ranties be deprived of effect by extrinsic evidence of facts not them-
selves incorporated into the writing? Examples are: a showing
that the article sold was a patented or trade name article or that
the buyer did not rely upon the seller's judgment, either of which
might be offered to defeat the implied warranty of fitness for
purpose; that the seller was not a manufacturer or grower, to
defeat the warranty of merchantability under the older law; or
that the seller was not in possession, to defeat a warranty of title
at the same stage; or any express agreement, disclaimer, waiver,
or similar activity of the buyer limiting a warrant), which would
otherwise exist."8
The few cases which have dealt with the problem exclude
only the last mentioned, viz., specific activity, usually a statement,
particularly limiting the warranty which would otherwise follow.T
55 In general, see Williston, Sales, 2nd Ed., secs. 239, 239A. Also a
note (1929) 14 Corn. L. Quart. 506.
56The buyer's assent to the seller's statement limiting an existing war-
ranty would, in effect, be the buyer's statement and thus would be his
jurally unfavorable utterance.
5 7The case squarely on the point of a disclaimer is Calpetro Producer's
Syndicate v. Woods Co., (1929) 206 Cal. 246, 274 Pac. 65, denying the
seller the right to show by parol that the buyer waived the implied war-
ranty of title. The following cases hold that it cannot be shown by parol
that the buyer was aware of a defect allegedly warranted against: Watson
v. Roods, (1890) 30 Neb. 264, 46 N. W. 491, and Hogan's Exr. v. Carland
and Rutledge, (1833) 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 283. Some cases involving the sale
of land likewise suggest useful analogies: Miller v. Desverges, (1885) 75
Ga. 407; Harlow v. Thomas, (1833) 15 Pick. (Mass.) 66; LaFrance v.
Kashishian, (1928) 204 Cal. 643, 269 Pac. 655.
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Why is this? Why should the one type of negativing facts be per-
mitted and the other forbidden? Is there any difference in the
nature of the operative facts? One suggests itself. That which is
permitted is something other than jurally unfavorable conduct.
That which is excluded is such jurally unfavorable conduct.
Thus these cases likewise support the conclusion that the true
test of what is natural to integrate and what is not is that it is
natural to write in such operative facts as consist of jurally un-
favorable statements, either those imposing liability for extrinsic
warranties themselves, or, as here, those destroying the rights of
the speaker, viz., disclaimers of otherwise existing warranties.
CONCLUSION
The crux of Professor Williston's suggestion is that the quasi-
contractual assertive warranties should be showable by parol. But
how shall we determine which are contractual and which quasi-
contractual? How shall we draw the line between prophecies of
future events and assertions of present fact, the line which is
necessitated by the proposition under discussion?
If the true test of whether it is "natural" to integrate opera-
tive facts is in terms of "contractual" or "quasi-contractual," then
Professor Williston's theory is sound. If, on the other hand, the
correct principle is that it is natural to integrate all jurally un-
favorable statements, the suggestion is unsound.
To support the Williston suggestion, there are two matters.
first, a comparison of the assertive warranty with the fraudulent
representation situation, for which latter the operative facts may
be shown by parol, and, second, a realization that so few cases
dealing squarely with the assertive warranty have been decided
under the Sales Act and in view of an understanding by the in-
stant court that the act has possibly created a new type of liability
not existing before.
On the other hand, denying the Williston thesis and support-
ing the test of "jurally unfavorable statement" are the cases
squarely on the point of the assertive warranty, which can be
rationalized in terms of the jurally unfavorable test. Also there
are two other groups of cases which can be rationalized in those
terms, viz., the cases differentiating between prophetic warranties
and implied ones of fitness and the few cases on parol disclaimers
of existing warranties.
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Furthermore, on abstract theory, it seems to the writer that it
is more "natural" to write in jurally unfavorable statements and
to leave as oral other operative facts than it is to write in pro-
phecies and to leave out all else. Then, too, the distinction be-
tween jurally unfavorable statements and all else is an easier one
to make in practice than is the distinction necessitated by the \Vil-
liston suggestion, viz., between phophecies and assertions of present
fact. Finally, the assertive warranty more closely resembles the
prophetic or promissory one which must be integrated than it
does the implied warranties which need not be. The resemblance
between prophetic and assertive warranties, indicated by the com-
mon denominator of being jurally unfavorable statements, is a
much closer one than is to be found by comparing the assertive
warranty with the implied ones under the concept of the attach-
ment of liability without intention.
All things considered, the majority of theoretical propositions
line up with the cases squarely in point, so that it would seem that
Professor Williston's suggestion that assertive warranties should
be provable by parol is sound neither in authority nor in theory.
